

THE
SPEECH
OF
THOMAS GOOLD,
ESQUIRE,
IN THE
IRISH HOUSE OF COMMONS,
February 14, 1800,
ON THE SUBJECT OF
AN INCORPORATE UNION
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.



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MR. GOOLD'S SPEECH,

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On Friday, the 14th of February, 1800.

UNUSUAL as it may seem, Mr. Speaker, that a Member who has but just had the honour of taking his seat in this House, should present himself to your notice, and throw himself on your indulgence; yet does he think himself not only warranted, but called upon, to deliver his sentiments and opinions on the awful question which so deeply agitates the public mind. If he should even take up more of the time of the House than is customary upon a first occasion, he hopes the magnitude and importance of the subject will ensure him that attention which, on any other occasion, he could not ask or expect. In truth, Sir, the times we live in seem unmarked by any of the ordinary rules of human proceeding. Perhaps the history of the world, from the creation to the present hour, never exhibited to the eyes or understanding of men a spectacle more singular than that

before me. I am at this moment addressing an assembly which it had been our pride and our boast to have considered as the representative wisdom and integrity of the Irish nation. On what subject am I going to address them? Will posterity believe that a proposition had been made to this House, that it should become its own accuser, and be its own judge? Will posterity believe, that this House not only listened without indignation to this impious proposal, but, in compliance with the mandate of a foreign power, accused and pronounced upon itself the sentence of an ignominious condemnation? Am I, then, wrong in stating, that the history of the world has furnished no instance like this? A proposal, I say, which, in defiance of all the impulses of nature, and all the honourable affections of the heart, calls upon an assembly, not destitute of wisdom, talent, and virtue, to extinguish itself, on the audacious and insulting grounds of its incompetency and its crimes! Sir, I do not yet despair of the salvation of Ireland. The late events in this House have produced the only effect worthy of a nation of freemen. They have alarmed, but they have not dismayed us: they have enabled us to see our danger, but they have not disposed us to sink under it. Instead of paralyzing, they have inspired exertion. I do congratulate this House, I do congratulate this Nation, that we are not assembled here, with rueful countenances and desponding hearts, to pay the last tribute to the departed liberties of Ireland. I do congratulate this House and this Nation, that we have not marched hither, in slow and solemn procession, to weep over the tomb of the Irish Constitution. No, Mr. Speaker; my prophetic heart tells me, that I shall survive this desperate effort, and that I shall be laid low ere the Constitution be-



gins to droop. **THIS NATION HATES THE UNION, AND IT WILL NOT PASS.** The friends of the people, in this House, are bound to maintain their rights; and as those rights are most respected when they are best understood, so do I protest against the competency of this House to vote the act of Union.

Ere this degrading measure had been proposed to the Irish people, the grounds of its success had been previously arranged. It was imagined, that no man could hope for the success of Irish independence, in a struggle against Ministerial power. The event of the last year has furnished a melancholy reflection—that the victory of a brave and generous people over Ministerial audacity and confidence, might be converted to the mournful purpose of emblazoning its future defeat. The triumph of Irish liberty gave to the British Minister a new opportunity of exhibiting the natural stubbornness and pertinacity of his character. Untaught to profit by discomfiture or misfortune, he who had laid the plan of the campaign against your liberties, disdained the expedient of retreating with prudence from the field of battle, but in the very moment of disaster and defeat assumes the haughty aspect of victory, and the insolent language of triumph. He had arranged his forces, and calculated on his chances. He full well knew that his only chance was in Parliament; and hence it is, that, with unblushing effrontery, he contends for the power of Parliament against the rights of the people. He foresaw that 116 placemen and pensioners were better materials for his purpose, than the demands, desires, and inprescriptible rights of the people of Ireland. 'Tis strange, however, that, with as much argumentative power as ever man possessed, with a gigantic intellect and copious vocabu-

lary, this Minister did not condescend to argue a question of such magnitude *à priori*, but has taken post within the entrenchments of two miserable precedents, viz. the Union with Scotland, and the Septennial Bill in 1716—I refer you to his printed speeches of the 22d and 31st of January 1799. If you will examine his propositions with the attention which a common understanding gives to a question of no great difficulty, but yet of great importance, you will find that they do not contain a single principle on which his doctrine can be maintained. As the British Minister, who, no doubt, is great authority, has also enlisted in his cause some characters to whom this country once looked up with veneration and love, I hope it will not be deemed inapposite or presumptuous, if I should ask your particular attention, while I endeavour to maintain opinions founded upon the most mature reflection, and already given to the public in the most unqualified manner. I hope I shall not be deemed to trespass much upon your patience, when I also state, that my object is to present to my countrymen the nature of those rights which I conceive to be the unalienable inheritance of the people; those rights which, in contradiction to the language of the British Minister, never are in *abeyance*, but are vested, and never can be divested, either in the cabinet, or in the field of battle: their effects may be suspended, or destroyed; but the rights themselves are unperishable and immortal, surviving with undiminished glory and essence the day of victory, or the day of defeat. It may be imagined, that when I enter the lists with the Minister of Great Britain, and some dignitaries of the law, on a point purely constitutional, I undertake a task which, from the inferiority of my means, promises little hopes of success. But 'tis error only

which requires the ingenuity of argument, or the decoration of language. The fair cause of Truth stands in need of no such fictitious supporters ; it is its own sublimest, most successful advocate. This question, then, I dare to argue with any man, however fertile his genius, deep his learning, or persevering his industry. I say it, that this House is not competent to vote the act of Union ; and this I shall endeavour to demonstrate on the four following grounds. 1st, The nature of the question itself. 2dly, The original conformation of Parliament, and the acknowledged destination of its duties. 3dly, From precedents undeniable, and authorities the most respectable ; and, 4thly, From the actual, and not theoretical, state of our representation.

With respect to the first. The advocates for the competency of Parliament insist, that by the Union there would be no change of the Constitution ; thereby impliedly admitting, that if it were a change of the Constitution, the Parliament would not be competent to enact it : for if that were not the necessary implication, why employ so much time, and bestow so much trouble and pains, to prove that which, when proved, would be nugatory ? for if the Parliament have a right to change the Constitution, why endeavour to shew, as a ground for that right or competence, that a particular measure under consideration would not change the Constitution ? Indeed, the very words adopted by the advocates for the competency of Parliament, leave no doubt on this head : Say they—" The Union will not change the Constitution, it will only be a new mode of administering the Constitution." But to put this question in a very simple manner—The Union will either change the Constitution, or it will not ; if its advocates answer in the negative, then it is for me to shew

that it will ; if they answer in the affirmative, then I am brought to the second head of my division on this topic. First, then, (as to this question, and all others which form the ground of treaty between Great Britain and Ireland), those two kingdoms must be considered, separate, distinct, independent states : for, though they may have existed centuries on centuries united by common interest, yet they are, constitutionally speaking, to all intents and purposes independent states, and so admitted, in express terms, by the British Minister himself, in his printed speech, page 21. If it so happened, that the Constitution of this country were different from the Constitution of Great Britain, then it will not be denied, that a measure which gave the British Constitution in the place of the Irish, from which it was different, would change the Constitution. This was the case of Scotland, the parliamentary Constitution of which was essentially different from that of Great Britain ; the constitutional prerogatives of the Crown of which were also different from those of the Crown of Great Britain, as may be seen by two acts of Parliament in Scotland, called the Acts of Security and Concerning Peace and War. The only ground, therefore, that the advocates for an Union have on this part of the case, is the similitude between the British and the Irish Constitutions. Has any one of these men said more or less than this, that by an Union you will still have King, Lords, and Commons?—I refer you to their printed speeches, their addresses, and their pamphlets. If this argument were to be conclusive (and if it be not conclusive, it can have no force at all), then an Union, by which the Irish nation would have no share in the representation at all, would be no change in the Constitution ; for you would still have King, Lords, and

Commons—and of course the same principle would apply, not only to King, Lords, and Commons, sitting at Westminster, but to the same species of Constitution, whether at Petersburg or Constantinople. But to put a simple case: It is the undoubted Constitution of Ireland, that the people of Ireland should be taxed by their representatives only, and none other—Will any man deny this as a present subsisting right? If it requires then any measure to alter or destroy this right, the measure which affects it alters or destroys the Constitution, of which this very right forms part (and the most considerable part) of its essence—and, I believe, I need not more than assert to those strange and infatuated constitutionalists, that any cause that changes part of the essence of any substance, necessarily alters the substance in which it is inherent. This holds equally in morals and politics, as well as in physics. I should have been ashamed to argue this part of the case, had I not heard it gravely asserted in and out of Parliament, that this measure did not in anywise alter our Constitution. I was the more disposed to argue this point, inasmuch as I had heard it contended by a great law luminary, who, unfortunately for the rights and liberties of Ireland, gives the assistance of his splendid talents to the Minister on this question, that the Union would not change the Constitution. If it would not be considered too daring to guess at his opinions, I might say that he maintains the competency of Parliament, on the ground alone that the Union would not change the Irish Constitution.

Having cleared the question as to this point, and having, as I humbly submit, left the advocates for this measure no other hold than the absolute authority of Parliament to change the Constitution as to it shall seem fit, let me be

permitted to join issue with them on this question, and see whether the Constitution of this country gives to the Parliament a right of such tremendous magnitude. In arguing this question, the first consideration that presents itself is, what do the advocates of the Union mean, when they speak of the competence of the Parliament to enact this measure? As they cannot mean that which admits of no argument, viz. the competence of Parliament, at the express desire, and with the express concurrence of the people, so they must contend for this competence, unsupported by such materials as the desire and concurrence of the people. I believe it will not be denied, that in all legitimate Governments, political power first originated from the people—and in all free countries the abuse of that power takes it out of the hands of those to whom it has been delegated, and it ultimately reverts to the people. This principle may be said to carry itself too far—Granted that it might in practice; but if the principle be not true, then the delegation of power to the individual or individuals, is nothing more nor less than the delegation of that which may be used or abused at discretion—for if the people be not the ultimate judges of what is the abuse of power, I should be glad to know who is—and I should also be glad to ask, in that case, what Government could exist that might not be tyrannical, or otherwise, according to the temper, disposition, and character of the governor or governors?

All writers admit of a compact, either express or implied, between the prince and the people; and they at the same time admit the right of recurrence to first principles, in case of the breach of that compact. If, then, such a compact as this exists, attended with such circumstances of right on

the part of the people, there may also exist a compact, either express or implied, between the people and their representatives—and on the infringement of which, I trust, it will not be denied that there should exist of right an adequate remedy. Let me now ask, what is meant by the term, representatives of the people? Are they not constitutionally supposed to be the organ of the people? That is, they are constitutionally supposed to speak the sentiments of the people: for were they any other, they would be any thing but representatives of the people; and, indeed, the Prime Minister of Great Britain admits this to its fullest extent in his speech, the 22d of January 1799, page 29. This is not only our constitutional doctrine, but it is a wise constitutional doctrine, because it would be absurd in the highest degree to be obliged to recur to those sentiments which the people have allowed their representatives to speak for them. But in the argument on this question, the fallacy arises from not distinguishing between the word *without* and the word *against*: according to our Constitution, the representatives have a right to act *without* the consent of the people, because it happens, that on all ordinary occasions the people are silent.

Now this brings me to consider another proposition—Have the people a right to speak their sentiments?—I never heard it denied that they had: And, indeed, if there were a doubt as to this point, the conduct of Government itself has established the right; for they themselves appealed from the Parliament to the People—thereby expressly recognizing the principle, that the voice of this House, which is *constitutionally* the voice of the People, may be at variance with the *real* voice of the People; and, indeed, I might il-

illustrate this position by a very remarkable instance. The Minister of Great Britain owes his elevation to the exercise of this very principle. Had the voice of Parliament been the voice of the People, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer had, perhaps, never proved the ruin of Great Britain, and the successful enemy of Ireland : He owes his station to the right the people have of declaring their sentiments without resorting to their constitutional organ : He owes his power to a principle, which I hope will be as eternal as it is just—that when the representatives and their constituents are committed, the victory must be on the side of the people : if they have this right to declare their opinions, that right must exist for some purpose or other ; for it would be absurd to suppose a right without an end. What, therefore, can be the purpose or object of this right ? It cannot be for the useless honour of declaring their will, in order that that will should be despised and disregarded ; but it is in order that their desires and wishes should have their full force and operation : and this not only appears by the doctrine already proved, that the Parliament has the right to enact any measure, by virtue of its being considered to speak the sense of the people ; but also on the best authorities, of which I shall speak presently. Now, I have already shewn that Parliament is supposed to speak the sense of the people, because the people themselves do not speak, and on most occasions ought not to speak ; but this presumption, like all others in law and constitution, falls to the ground, when at variance with the fact itself. My recapitulation, therefore, on this head, is, that since it is admitted on all hands, that as the voice of Parliament is only legal inasmuch as it is *supposed* to be the voice of the people, and since there are cases where the people

have themselves a right to speak, it therefore naturally follows, that where the voice of the Parliament is different, in fact, from the voice of the people, it loses the only ground on which it is admitted that its authority is legal ; and although I admit the Parliament to be competent to all ordinary acts *without* the express consent of the people, yet I do most solemnly protest against that competence, when exercised on any occasion *against* the express desires of the people. Let me quote, in this place, an extract from Mr. Justice Blackstone, 1st vol. Com. p. 212 : “ Whenever a question arises “ between the society at large, and any Magistrate vested “ with powers originally delegated by that society, it must “ be decided by the voice of the society itself—there is not “ upon earth any other tribunal to resort to.”

Having thus shewn (at least to my own conviction), that when the people speak, their voice ought to be binding even on ordinary occasions—’tis fit that I should expose still farther the absurdity of those who contend for the right of Parliament to *change* our Constitution. The first proposition that presents itself to my mind is—if the Parliament have *lawful authority* to change the Constitution, it may do it in any way, and for whatsoever purpose, it may think proper ; because such a right must be considered as a principle, and not as an expedient. It would be idle, indeed, to maintain, that it has a right to change it one way only, and not the right to change it in all ways : The same authority, therefore, by which the Union might be passed, may also enact the right of taxation to exist without any controul in the Crown, or may do any other act by which the Constitution becomes *in toto* repealed. It may, if its authority be supreme, pass an act, by which this country shall be incorporated with the

Cisalpine Republic, or with the uncontrouled Monarchy of the Grand Seignior. In short, there is nothing that, according to the votaries of its omnipotence, it may not do. Independent, however, of the absurdity that must follow, if those created had the power of disposing of those who created them against their own wish and consent—independent of the monstrosity of that doctrine which would give to a delegation, limited in its nature, and finite in its duration, the properties of boundless authority—independent of that solecism in law by which a deputy could transfer or divide his functions to or with another—let us see whether our ancestors did not think that there were certain constitutional points out of the reach of Parliamentary encroachment; which were absolute and indefeasible, and not depending on the fortuitous circumstance of legislative forbearance. I shall not detain you by a long catalogue of precedents, because, for my purpose, it is sufficient that our ancestors recognized the principle, that there were certain grand fundamental laws which the Parliament had no right to change. And this brings me to the third topic of my division.

In the 33d and 34th Edw. III. it is declared, "*that all men should have their laws and free customs as largely and wholly as they had used to have at any time when they had them best; and if any statutes had been made, or any customs brought in to the contrary, ALL SUCH STATUTES AND CUSTOMS SHOULD BE VOID.*" Again, in the statute of 42d Edw. III. it is expressly said, "*that all statutes made against Magna Charta are void.*"—What does Sir Edward Coke say, while acting as a manager of the Commons in the preparation of the Petition of Rights? "*Take we heed what we yield unto; Magna Charta is such a fellow, he will have no Sovereign.*"—

Need I go farther, and state, that there was not an act in those days which did not recognize the rights of every individual to certain fundamental laws? Need I mention, that on the various pillars of your Constitution, I mean Magna Charta, the Declaration of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement, are mentioned expressly, that these "*fundamental laws are the absolute, hereditary, descendible, and inherent right of every Englishman, which it is his birth-right to enjoy entire?*"

What say the advocates for this competency of Parliament, this impious omnipotence, to that act of Parliament passed in the reign of Henry VIII. by which the Proclamation of the King was declared to be Law? Was it ever held by any lawyer or constitutional writer that that act was law? And yet it was an act of an omnipotent Parliament. What are the very words of our ancestors? "*That acts of Parliament made against the fundamental laws of the land, are ipso facto void.*" Can any language be stronger than this? What says my Lord Hobart, in the case of Day and Savage? (Hob. Rep. 85): "*Whatever is against natural reason and equity, is against law; nay, if an act of Parliament were made against natural reason and equity, that act was void.*"—What says Lord Coke, in the first part of his Inst. fol. 97. 6? "*Nothing can have the force of law that is contrary to reason.*" Now, can any thing be more contrary to natural reason and equity, than that an Assembly, whose power is derived from the people, and whose acts are lawful only as they are supposed to speak the sense of the people, shall, at one and the same time, be supposed to speak the voice of the people, and yet, in fact and reality, differ from the voice of the people? Is it any thing more or less than to give to a fic-

tion the triumph over reality, to controul by the imagination the very existence of things, and to suffer a presumption to destroy the very evidence of our senses?

I shall conclude this part of the case with the following extracts:—They are the principles and doctrines of the wisest Statesmen that ever lived; they were the sentiments of the most illustrious advocate that the cause of Monarchy ever recorded. I have within my view an honourable gentleman, who well knows how dear I was to that great man: his notice first gilded my humble station—I trust the principles I maintain, and the conduct I shall pursue, will never render me unworthy of a friendship which above all others I esteemed the most. The never-to-be-forgotten Edmund Burke does, in his speech on Economical Reform, p. 4, lay down the law with respect to the rights of the people: “This measure (says he) is *necessary from the DEMANDS of the people, whose DESIRES where they do not militate with the stable and eternal rules of justice and reason (rules which are above us and above them), ought to be as a LAW to an House of Commons.*” Again, p. 12: “It would be most dishonourable for a faithful representative of the Commons to take advantage of any inarticulate expression of the People’s WISHES, in order to frustrate the attainment of what they have an UNDOUBTED RIGHT to expect.”

But the Prime Minister of Great Britain says, that if Parliament has no such competence, then what is to become of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Scotland, and the Septennial Bill in 1716? This is what the logicians call the *argumentum ad absurdum*—I answer the British Minister very openly as to these acts. In the first place, as to the Union of Scotland, I do not think it wise or necessary to

canvass the original validity of that measure, or to comment upon the means by which it was accomplished—I think it a waste of time to state to the House, that Lord Godolphin thought it prudent to insure the measure by a very large armed force. It is not for me to inquire, at this day, what were the rights of the Scottish people—it is not for me to hint, that there never was a more unequal contest than that between right and power: it is sufficient to my purpose to say, that all constitutional writers, that all lawyers, admit, that even original wrong may be sanctified by time and acquiescence, as is the case at this day of the Norman Conquest. Far be it from me to enter into a wordy crusade for the imaginary rights of the Scottish people. I have no inclination to contend for an obsolete right, if that right exist at all. My only purpose is to shew, that this precedent proves nothing in favour of the competence of Parliament; because at the time this competence was not admitted, although I admit, that at this day the act itself is clearly valid, as I before stated, from time and acquiescence.

But if ever there was an unhappy precedent, it is that of the Septennial Bill, in the year 1716. By this Bill (which, you will observe, originated in the House of Lords), the Parliament protracted its own duration to seven years, although the Members of the House of Commons had been expressly elected but for three years. It is curious to observe, that the supporters of this Bill, in the debate thereon, never contended for the constitutional legality of the measure, but recommended its adoption on the ground of necessity—that never-failing pretext for the exercise of power. Observe the words of Mr. Lyddall, who was the warmest supporter of the Bill: “*That it was a business of necessity to*

administer an extraordinary remedy to an extraordinary disease."

The particular necessity relied on, was the critical posture of their continental affairs. Look, however, to the language of Mr. Shippen, and other Members ; and see whether they conceived that an House of Commons, elected by the people for a *limited time*, had a right to protract its own existence. Look to the authority of one of the greatest law luminaries that England ever produced ; I mean Sir Robert Raymond, afterwards Lord Raymond, Chief Justice of England ; and see what he says upon the constitutional competence of Parliament. Will any man in his senses put the authority of an interested, prerogative Minister, in competition with that of my Lord Raymond ? Inasmuch, therefore, as this precedent never was argued on the point of right, but justified on the ground of *necessity*—inasmuch as its very advocates (as it were) gave up the point of right, and its opposers insisted thereon—inasmuch as the greatest constitutional authorities in England were the most decidedly of opinion against the competence of the House to protract its own duration, much less to destroy the Constitution—since this incompetence was insisted on, even though it did not appear that the people were hostile to the Bill—it therefore follows, that this precedent, failing even in a greater degree than the former, is an authority in point for those who maintain the incompetence of Parliament to change the Constitution.

I hope I have not unsuccessfully combated the doctrines, arguments, and precedents of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. If I have, sure I am that it is not owing to the weakness of the cause. Let us now come to the fourth head of my division on this subject, *viz.* the state of our

Representation. Now, let us suppose the present Parliament dissolved, for the purpose of having another summoned *ad hoc*. This must be done with the view of taking the sense of the electors on this particular question. You observe I make use of the word *electors*: it only belongs to the wretched advocates for this competency of Parliament to substitute the word *populace* for electors, as has been done. Behold, then, the Parliament met: the question comes on: the sixty-four Members for the thirty-two counties, and all the Members for the great cities, vote against the Union; but it is supported by the borough interest, who have clearly a majority in Parliament. Will any man pretend to tell me that such an act could be binding of right on the people? Have I put an absurd case? You know I have not.—Add to this the number of placemen and pensioners who may be obliged to vote contrary to their known opinion, by means whereof the vote of the Parliament is any thing but the expression of the will of that very Parliament.—Have I put another absurd case? You know I have not.

Now let me carry this argument still farther. I assert, without the hazard of a contradiction, that the sense even of Parliament is in substance and virtue against this disastrous measure. In order to give any legal validity to the acts of this House, I have already shewn that this House must be supposed to speak the sense of the People. Does any man deny this position? If he does, let him speak now.—Not a word—No; the proposition is too plain to be denied, even by the flippant fervility of a placeman or a pensioner. The doctrine is too well rivetted in the hearts of this nation to be combated without probable danger and certain disgrace. We have not yet prostrated the cause of truth at the feet of

military despotism. The most arrant courtier of you all will therefore not deny, that the votes of this House are, by the Constitution, *presumed* to be the voice of the People. Well, how stands the case in truth and in fact even in this House?—With all your artifices, with all your influence, with all your menaces, with all your temptations, with all your promises, you have not been able to shake the steady virtue of thirty-nine county Members, and the great majority of the Members for your open towns. You know, that with the proportion of near two to one of such Members against your measure, you cannot be audacious enough to say, that you have even the sense of Parliament with you. No; you have the *constitutional* sense of Parliament decidedly against you. Do you pretend to say, that two or three Burgeses are the People? Where are the People to be found? They are to be found in their constitutional and collective capacity out of this House, or by their *real*, and not fictitious, representatives within this House. When I mention the word “People,” I mean not the populace. When I speak of their constitutional and collective capacity out of the House, I hold a language that is as old as the Constitution—I speak of Petitions to Parliament—I speak of county meetings under the Sheriff or Magistrates—I speak of that right which reverts to the People by the death or dissolution of the Parliament. You know the People are almost unanimously against you, and therefore it is that you treat as ridiculous and dangerous any appeal to the People. You know the *real* representatives of the People in this House are against you; and therefore it is that you contend that a majority, which you have acquired by means too notorious to deserve comment, is the sense of the nation. You tell

this nation openly, that you are to make pecuniary compensation to your borough proprietors. The Noble Lord has stated it distinctly in his speech; and you, in the same breath, contend, that a majority, which you avow you have bought, shall bind the people.—Gracious God! can any thing be more vile or monstrous than this? Will the British Nation, in whose fate we have been and are so deeply interested, whose sufferings we have shared, and are willing still to share, with whom we are willing to stand or fall—will they, I say, endure it, that we, the people of Ireland, should be sacrificed to a theory which cannot fail, sooner or later, to prostrate the British Constitution? If Ireland be slaves, Britain never can be free—Slavery is a malady of a most infectious nature—And is there an Englishman to be found who will not admit, that to force a Constitution on us which we hate, is TYRANNY, and that the submission thereto is SLAVERY? The same Minister who mocks the rights of Ireland will not fail to trample on the rights of Britain too. Unwise (not to say ungenerous) will be the conduct of Great Britain, if she suffers this country to be a sullen and reluctant part of the British empire. The people of Great Britain (I do verily believe it, Mr. Speaker) are ignorant of our real situation: they are too good and too wise to suffer the Minister to persevere in a measure which this nation execrates. If there be any doubt on this head, resort to any constitutional mode of collecting the sense of the people—Let the Parliament be dissolved—In short, let this measure have some claim or other to the acquiescence and obedience of the people.—What would be thought by the people of Great Britain, if, on a measure of vital consequence, the Minister were to persevere against the determined opposition

of the independent part of the British Parliament? If a majority of the country and great towns, in the proportion of two to one, were to resist, not only an ordinary measure, but an awful change of their Constitution, would they hesitate in pronouncing a Minister, who would think of proceeding on the strength of a mere borough majority, either a tyrant, or insane? And that which is against the eternal principles of truth and justice in Great Britain, is so here, and elsewhere. Tyranny or insanity have no claims to respect from friends or foes. We can expect no fair dealing from the the British Minister; but we have a right to it from the British people—They will be recompensed—they never shall look in vain for the cordial and effectual co-operation of Ireland—This is the species of Union which, while it is honourable to Ireland, will be useful to Great Britain.—Indeed, Sir, this competency or omnipotence of Parliament to change the Constitution, is more absurd, the more it is considered. I shall not, on this head, detain you much longer.

Look to the arguments of the British Minister, and his disciples in this country: Say they, “As you have no confidence in your own Parliament, redress yourselves by resorting to an impartial Imperial Parliament: as your own Parliament is notoriously and intolerably corrupt, try your hand with our pure and virtuous Parliament; as your own Parliament is inadequate to extricate you from your state of misery and distress, resort to ours; and you will find your manners improved, your morals cultivated, your religious feuds subside, your agriculture promoted, your commerce increased, your manufactures multiplied, your condition ameliorated.” Yet is it contended by those very men who

hold this language, that a Parliament which is incompetent to administer any relief to our distresses, which is unable to mend the Constitution even with the wishes of the people, yet is competent to change or destroy the Constitution, against the express will and desire of the same people.

Sir, the proposers and supporters of this measure recommend it to the Irish people as fraught with many and singular advantages: they tell you, it will give you the British Constitution; that it will extend your commerce, and multiply your manufactures; that it is a measure of identification, and that it will give you peace. I object to the Union, because it cannot give to the Irish people the British Constitution; because the miserable addition of one hundred Irish Members, whose conduct is subject to no immediate inspection and controul, does necessarily tend to increase an influence already too powerful for the liberties of the people—an influence already supported at an enormous price, whereby individuals enjoy a disgraceful and fastidious splendour at the expence of the public—an influence that must necessarily bring within its corrupted circle, a great portion at least of those parliamentary missionaries from the Irish nation, who, from motives of self-interest, or motives of despair, will prefer a bribe or a place to the useless honour of making an ineffectual stand in favour of the prosperity of Ireland. I object to this Union, because, from the nature of our representation, Ireland cannot send forth even the smallest portion of its talent, to be the sentinel of Irish interests, or the champion of Irish rights. I object to this Union, because it puts an eternal extinguisher on the rising genius of my country. I object to this Union, because it degrades Ireland in the eyes of the world—because, from the mo-

ment that it passes, Ireland never can be known or heard of, but through the medium of some notorious job, or of silent and disgraceful acquiescence. I object to this Union, because an hundred Irish Members, even gifted with heavenly illumination and godlike uprightness, cannot do more than record, by the splendid struggles of unsuccessful virtue, the triumph of British injustice over Irish misfortune. I object to this Union, because it does, in my mind, go to demolish the already tottering roof of the British Constitution, and leave no covering for the people but under the wings of unprincipled despotism. I object to this Union, because it doth destroy that Constitution which was the splendid monument of political virtue, wisdom, and spirit—a Constitution that I had once fondly hoped would have been regarded as the tabernacle of the gods of old, to be approached with awe, to be contemplated with veneration, and to be violated with death—a Constitution whose birth was attended with all the gigantic emblems of heroic virtue, promulgated in accents to be heard at the poles, and visible to mankind by the steady splendour of its illumination. I object to a measure which not only dims the lustre, but destroys the essence of a Constitution, which I trust in God will never cease to shed its light upon the people, until, after having performed its ordinary course, it yields to nothing but the imperious dictates of nature.

But the Union is to give you advantages commercial and manufactural. From what quarter are these advantages to proceed? Great Britain cannot give them—for the best of all human reasons, having nothing to give. But supposing, for a moment, that it were in her power to concede unto this nation advantages of such a nature, yet would she not do it :

her circumstances, her necessities, require the aid of all her own resources : if she could be generous, she would not ; if she would, she could not—No ! Believe me, it is not in the character of nations to exercise the principles of an abstract generosity. It is not possible for a nation, sinking under its distresses, to practise a virtue unknown to it in the brightest day of its prosperity. On these heads, therefore, do you delude yourselves when you calculate any thing upon the score of British liberality. It may be objected to me here, that I am arguing to a distinctness after the Union, when by the Union such distinctness must be removed. That I have not so done, will appear when I come to speak of the Union as a measure of identification. But, after all, what good will arise to you from the increase of your commerce, and the extension of your manufactures ? None : you have as much commerce and manufactures as besit your infant prosperity. There can be no encouragement or security for any advantages, without the assistance of a free Constitution. A nation devoted to commerce, without regard to Constitution, must ultimately become a nation of slaves. But who has ever heard of buying commerce at the expence of the Constitution ? It is a traffic unknown to the interested speculations of mankind—I have heard of, nay, I have seen a nation of Constitution-makers ; but who has ever heard of a nation of Constitution-mongers ? I have seen a nation destroy a Constitution, and wading through seas of blood to another, which was perhaps worse : but who has ever heard of any nation bartering, deliberately bartering, its Constitution for a bribe ?—No ; you might travel through the swamps and marshes of Holland, you might survey a people devoted to gold, a nation of misers, a traf-

ficking people, buying and selling every thing, and not find a single man who would set up his liberty to the highest and fairest bidder. I may be told that our liberty is a notion, and our independence a chimera. Be it so: but if that notion and that chimera make me happy, I will not sell them for any earthly human consideration—Sooner would I seclude this nation from all human intercourse, than sell a drachm of public liberty for the commerce of the habitable globe.

I object, Sir, to this Union, because, instead of a measure of identification, it is a measure of disunion. I shall here take occasion to make one or two remarks on the statement of the Noble Lord—He has stated to this House, that, at the commencement of the war, the respective debts of Great Britain and Ireland were in the ratio of 100 to 1; while, at the present day, the proportion is as 13 to 1.—Sir, give me leave to say, that the Noble Lord has exaggerated the first, and greatly under-stated the second, as may be easily seen by an inspection of the papers on your table. But, were the statement correct, what would the Noble Lord infer? That we cannot go on without adopting a measure which, in the financial department, he conceives a measure of retrenchment for Ireland. When I come to consider this department in the detail, I hope to be able to shew, that not only the Noble Lord's statements are incorrect, but that his deductions have been fallacious—I hope to be able to shew, that if the Union existed at the commencement of the war, this nation would (even on his own plan of calculation) owe much more than it does at present. But, Sir, there is nothing alarming in this exaggerated disproportion; and if I may be permitted to resort to a simple, and, perhaps, a

vulgar illustration, I might shew how fallacious this deduction is. May I put a simple case? When the Noble Lord was one year old, and his father was thirty, his father of course was thirty times as old as he; but, at this day, if the Noble Lord's father were to continue the proportion, he would be a successful competitor with a man named Methusalem. But to proceed to this miraculous measure of identification—The Noble Lord has truly stated, that there are but two methods by which the respective debts of both nations could be arranged, *viz.* 1st, by Great Britain paying to Ireland such a sum of money as would put the system of taxation on a proportional footing; or, 2dly, by keeping the respective debts of both countries separate and distinct. This latter method is the one adopted. Here then, Mr. Speaker, is a distinctness recognized by the very terms of the Union; and what species of distinctness? That of all others, whether it be considered with reference to individuals or nations, which is the most likely to be a bone of contention—it is the distinctness of the purse. Now let me put this point to you in a very simple way—since the debts of the two countries are to be kept distinct, it follows of course, that the means by which these debts are to be paid must be also kept distinct and separate. Now what are these means, and from what sources do they arise? They are the customs and excise, which arise from commerce and internal duties. Since I am warranted in considering these resources as a fixed and given quantity, it follows of course, that in proportion as Ireland gains, Great Britain must lose, and *vice versa*. What now becomes of those splendid advantages which Great Britain is to concede to, or divide with Ireland? What think you now of this measure of identification? Yes; you

may add Ireland to Great Britain ; but 'tis God alone that can identify them. I know of no identification that could be useful or honourable, save that which flows through the avenues of the heart—every thing demonstrates to me that it is no measure of identification, but a measure of finance—that dreadful word “ Revenue” lost America—I will not say more. I would recommend it to the Minister to be satisfied with the spontaneous effusions of Irish liberality. He will find a system of friendship more productive than a system of domination. Let me hear no more of this identification—when the Irish people feel in contradiction to the impulses of nature ; when to be debased, is to be considered exalted ; when to be betrayed, is to be considered protected ; when to be cajoled, is to be considered as fairly dealt by ; when a sense of injury and injustice is to be converted into a sentiment of affection and gratitude,—then, and then only, may it be said, that an Union of Legislatures will be a measure of identification.

I object, Mr. Speaker, to the Union, because, instead of peace, I consider it a measure of war ; yes, it will give the peace which exists between the imbecility of oppressed and disarmed virtue, and the triumph of victorious crime ; yes, it will give the peace that exists between the devoted victim, and the merciless assassin ; yes, it will give you the cheerless peace of the tombs. Yes, Sir, the British Minister will give you peace, when, after enforcing the measure we hate, he, like the midnight murderer, leans in hideous attitude over the prostrate liberties of Ireland.—Vain calculator ! who can prefer this peace to that which heaven-born, heaven-descending, moves with angel step, and is decked with angel grace ; that peace which travels unarmed

through your land ; that peace which generated by affection, and living in the heart, is as eternal as are the principles of life ; that peace whose bounties are not dealt out by the standard of a contracted measure, but are the plentiful offerings of an overflowing heart ? This is the unparchmented, unarticled peace, that should exist between Great Britain and Ireland.

I come now, Sir, to a topic not unsuccessfully used by the advocates for Union ; I come to a topic on which one gentleman in this House (who last year rejected the Union, and maintained the incompetence of this House to enact it) has given in this session his vote in support of it.—I am going to speak of the imputed corruption of Parliament. In order to give this miserable position the semblance of argument, two propositions should appear clear and self-evident : First, that our Constitution, as at present established, does contain in it no recuperative quality, by which this corruption can be remedied ; and, secondly, that even though it did, yet that it would not be as safe for the people of Ireland to recur to this corrective expedient *within* the Constitution, as to adopt this measure of an Union, which exterminates the Constitution. Now, it is a gross libel on the Constitution, which you so gloriously achieved, to say, that it does not itself supply all the materials necessary to its improvement and stability. Woe to the country that is obliged to travel beyond the landmarks of its own Constitution for the prosperity and happiness of its people ! Base, abject, and degraded the nation that would look for any other interference than its own for the internal peace and tranquillity of its inhabitants ! What has become of that heroic virtue, that steady wisdom, which only a few

years back raised you from a state of insignificance and slavery, to the meridian of liberty and splendor? Think not that these qualities have been banished from among us. If their operations be not extinguished by your folly, and *your* baseness, they will, ere long, re-ascend to their station, and, under their active and successful influence, your destiny can neither be remote nor doubtful. Let no man tell you that the corruption of your Parliament is an irrefragable ground for its *annihilation*.

If this corruption, so much boasted by the advocates of this hateful measure, has grown upon the fair form of your Constitution, think not that the case is desperate—think not that it is any thing more than a vile excrescence, which impairs its beauty, but destroys not its essence; and which requires not the dagger, but the aid of a slight operation to get rid of for ever. Let no man persuade you that you never can remove it, but by the ignominious death of the Constitution itself. What inherent and peculiar malady is there in the Constitution of *Ireland*, that it shall be competent for any man to consign it to the Hospital of Incurables? What would be thought by the people of England, if any Minister were seriously to tell them, that their Constitution must be *destroyed*, because it could not be *repaired*? Is there any thing in the character or genius of your country which selects you from the rest of mankind, as fit to listen to so wicked and contemptible an argument as this? This argument never was generated but by the hardened effrontery of vice; it never was listened to but by the abject servility of despair. I promise you, that unless you yourselves become the murderers of your infant Constitution, its maturer years will afford unto yourselves and children the blessings of a free

people. I promise you that you are not asked to exchange it for a better. I promise you that those very men, who have not been prompted to the exercise of political virtue by the consciousness of right, and the gentle admonitions of your Constitution, must either quit their posts, or act under the terrors of its honest indignation. Blame not the Constitution itself, that it has been defiled ; it never has submitted to voluntary prostitution. If *some* of its natural guardians and protectors have basely trafficked on its youthful beauty, there are others who have not ceased to watch it with all the vigilance and anxiety of parental care—yes—I promise you that the talent and virtue of your country are at this moment its centinels. I tell you that those very centinels see and feel the glorious resuscitation of your Constitution in the discomfiture of this abominable measure.

No doubt we have had some reason to complain ; no doubt that the character of Parliament had fallen something in the public estimation. But if the source of that grievance be the decline of that connection, which, in a Constitution like ours, should ever exist between the Parliament and the People ; is there a man of common understanding, who can maintain that this very connection, so essential to our prosperity, is likely to be strengthened and improved by subducting the conduct of the representative from the immediate inspection and censure of him who made him ? Is there any man so perverted in understanding, as not to see that even our constitutional controul, were it to exist, could avail nothing against the over-weening of a *British* Minister in a *British* Parliament ? I tell you you are not warranted in sacrificing a Constitution which has not had a fair trial ; which has not yet arrived at its period of maturity. I tell

you, you are ungrateful to your Constitution, which, in the period of 17 years has done more, aye much more, than you were able to get during six hundred years, in which you were the elemosinary objects of British generosity. I tell you, you have no right to dispose of the inheritance of your children. I tell you, you might as well listen to the impious proposal of your physical extinction, as adopt this measure, which, in its nature, destroys the very principle of regeneration. I tell you, if Parliament has been corrupt, and the people debased, you have no right to exclude your children from the exercise of successful virtue. I tell you, in one word, that this corruption of Parliament is perishable, and is perishing; and that you have no right to give unto falsehood and crime an attribute which exclusively belongs to the eternal immutability of truth and virtue.

But supposing for a moment that Parliament were, in the words of His Majesty's Ministers, "incorrigibly corrupt," what will you gain by the exchange? Nothing. Are you yet to learn, that, without the assistance of an hundred Irish Members, the British Parliament has manifested as much servility and abject compliance as was ever visible in your own Parliament, even before the birth of your present Constitution? Are you yet to learn, that a Minister, who has scarcely left a shred of the old Constitution together, by which its identity can be ascertained—a haughty, vindictive, tyrannical, discomfited Minister, continues even now to ride triumphant on a large majority? Are you yet to learn, that it is this very man who has been always your *open* and *avowed* enemy—this very man who has been the author of all our complaints and grievances, who has now bethought himself of this measure of our salvation? Are you yet to

learn, that, during the too long and too fatal administration of this very man, your own Parliament has exhibited some splendid instances of real virtue ; while, during the same period, the British Parliament has not been able to redeem the uniformity of its compliance by a *single* act of constitutional energy and success? Are you yet to learn, that this very Minister full well knows, that his falling power never can be propped, but by administering unto the bankrupt necessities of Great Britain, the fresh and vigorous resources of your beautiful country? I tell you, this man has no notion of your utility, but in your sacrifice—I tell you, he is afraid to trust to the unbought offices of friendship, while he thinks it possible that he may stand on the ground of unprincipled power and authority—aye, I tell you, if that unfortunate day should ever arrive, you will be sacrificed, you will be ground—and in the moment of your desolation, you will curse the abject feeling which made you despond of the safety of your country—I tell you, there is not a man among you, who has been influenced by this wretched and impudent argument, who can assign a better motive for his conduct than the basest of all human motives—despair.

But if this argument be in its nature weak and delusive, what think you of the circumstances under which it is offered to the public notice? Have the people of Ireland, who alone are, or can be, the victims of this corruption of Parliament, come forward to demand its extermination? Have the people of Ireland, in the paroxysm of their despair, ever called upon the British Minister to rescue them from their Parliament, and allow them to take sanctuary in a tabernacle of his creation? Far otherwise. You know they never dreamt of this execrable measure ; much less

could they foresee the audacious arguments by which it is attempted to be supported. No, no; this very measure has been proposed, and this very argument relied on, by those very men who have been selling the people, and who now wish to traffic upon their own crimes. It is not sufficient with them that they have prostituted the character of Parliament, unless they can turn that very prostitution to their own private advantage and emolument. What can be said of a measure, recommended and countenanced by those very men, whose flagitious conduct has first created the argument, and who think they cannot consistently finish their political career, unless they can convert their unblushing shameless profligacy into an instrument of personal selfish speculation? Does the history of any country afford an instance of such abandoned political corruption as this? When was it ever heard of, that the governors of a free country had the audacity to call upon the people to be the bidders for their public crimes? When was it ever heard of, that a people above the situation of the most abject slavery, ever helped their governors to profit by their crimes, and to ride triumphant on their *avowed* remuneration? When was it ever heard of, that a brave and generous people consented to become the duped accomplices of so nefarious a traffic as this? There was a time at which no man would have ventured to have stated, much less argued with unrelaxed gravity, such propositions as these. There was a time at which the authors of this measure could not, throughout your whole country, have enlisted in their service a single base or dishonourable feeling: they might have traversed Ireland from North to South, from East to West, and not have found an individual, in whose heart they could take post for a moment—

no; they could not have found a single man, whose stubborn virtue they could have hoped to have staggered, on so base and dishonourable a ground, as his timidity, or his despair. The sentiments that *have been*, may be, and, if you profit by the passing events, they assuredly will be. Sure I am, however, that there can be little doubt of the issue of a contest between talented virtue, and untalented crime.

I object, Sir, to this Union, because it tends not only to increase, but to perpetuate a grievance which has, already proved, in no small degree, injurious to the prosperity of Ireland: it necessarily tends to reduce absenteeism to the regularity of a system. Think not that your propertied gentry will stay here. The blessing of a resident landlord will be a rare commodity in Ireland. The measure itself does in terms send forth no small portion of your landed property—but it is its fullen and remote consequences that I dread. Those who with me feel that this Union is hateful to the nation, will have little affection for a spot which can only tend to remind them of their misfortunes. This measure can have no intrinsic goodness, which can compensate for the shock it gives to national honour. It is not human to stifle a sense of injury, by the expedient of a cold and unfeeling calculation. This measure, I say, can have no substantial merit, can confer no substantial advantage, as long as it is remembered that it owed its success to the artifices of fraud, or the authority of arms. Dress your Union in whatsoever language you please, as long as it is hateful to the nation, it is a measure of conquest, and not a measure of treaty. Descant as long as you think fit upon the beneficial consequences of your measure, you never will

be able to make the people forget the injury, or forgive its authors. Believe me, there is not a man of independent mind, or independent means, who will be satisfied with a country which can exhibit nothing but the emblems of its former pride, and its present humiliation.—But again: Do you think you can keep Ireland without the aid of a strong military force? The Noble Lord has avowed the intention of increasing the peace establishment. I tell the Noble Lord, he can have no peace establishment in Ireland, in case he forces the Union. I tell the Noble Lord, that a war establishment will render his Union inoperative and ineffectual. The means to preserve, will not fail to destroy, the country. Great Britain, I say, cannot afford even the reluctant Loyalty of Ireland: No; she cannot do without her cordial co-operation. But think you that moderate men will remain in a country which it requires a prodigious army to cover? Think you that those who have been bred up in the habits of enjoying a free Constitution, will be satisfied with a country, on which there can exist but the authority of armed laws, and the sulky submission of reluctant obedience?—But this is not all; a measure which contracts the circle of national ambition, necessarily sends into exile a great proportion of the active mind of your country: therefore it is that I object to a measure which, instead of putting the talent of your country into requisition for your country, tends to reduce it to a system of foreign adventure—Your great proprietors will be absentees; your men of genius will be adventurers—With all your assertions, this country can have no charms for those who love liberty, and who feel the ambition of being known by the successful efforts of patriotic virtue.

I object, Mr. Speaker, to this Union, because it is admitted on all hands, that it will be injurious to the interests of this proud city. I object to this Union, because it is not safe to irritate the mighty population of this great town. When the Noble Lord talks of a mere locality, when speaking of Dublin, he has miscalculated. If the metropolis be ruined, the country cannot be advantaged. There is no such distinctness and disconnection between the capital and the rest of the kingdom. It is in my mind, like the heart, propelling heat and life to the extremities : it is the pride and ornament of our common country : it is not safe, I say, to irritate its monstrous population. I myself have seen some revolutions ; they all commenced, and were completed in the capital. Are you not dismayed when, in passing through the streets of this the third metropolis in Europe, you cannot see a single man, whose countenance bespeaks not determined hostility to your measure ? Are you not alarmed at the steady and determined language they hold, even at a time in which there is scarcely to be seen a street without a barrack, or a house without a foldier ? Think you that these symptoms will die away ? Think you that this discontent is temporary ? Think you that this language is the result of a romantic pride ? You are but bad reasoners and sorry politicians, when you think that Dublin will, at any time, be reconciled to this measure. You must not only destroy every trace of those splendid monuments which at this moment frown upon your measure, but you must intercept the future history of the Irish nation. Believe me, Dublin will never be satisfied with the funeral honour, of being another Palmira ; it will not

submit to the mournful dignity of desert streets and classic ruins. On this topic alone you are unwise, if not unjust, to force the act of Union.

I object to this Union, because it is a political experiment for the operation and effect of which there can be no human responsibility. I object to this Union, because it is proposed to this nation at a season little calculated for new and untried theory. There is no consistency in this. The Minister of Great Britain never fails to hurl the thunder of eloquent invective, against political innovations, against systems of external union and incorporation; and yet he chooses this as the season for a most awful innovation, for an imaginary system of union and incorporation. Is there nothing in the latter years of the eighteenth century that might give him an useful lesson on the subject of political change? What human foresight has covered the last ten years of the expiring century? Who, ten years ago, could have calculated on the events which have happened since? I hesitate not to say, that some events have happened which have mocked all human foresight, and baffled all human calculation? Who, ten years ago, could have guessed at the fate of the European systems? Who, ten years ago, could have foreseen the present condition of the European world? What will be said at this moment of the permanency of any *new* system, when the old and established institutions have nearly undergone the common lot of humanity; when the Germanic Union itself is tottering to its base; when, perhaps, a single battle may convert the grandest political structure in Europe into a shapeless mass of mighty ruin? How have these things happened? By

the love of change. Is it then prudent at such season, not only to recommend, but enforce new doctrines by the authority of Ministerial power? Is it at a moment at which, in this western empire, political virtue and wisdom may be said to consist in the veneration paid to old and established institutions, that it is prudent not to correct, but to exterminate; that it is judicious to dwell on the deformities of your Constitution, while you shroud its beauties; that it is wise to hold it up to the people as an object of horror and disgust? While the Minister flatters himself he may be able to destroy your Constitution which he so abuses, he does not recollect how difficult it will be to make the people enamoured with a Constitution of his making. Woe unto a system of dangerous experiment! Woe unto those who are setting the public mind afloat! While the machinations of man can be able to set it in motion, let it be recollected, that it is God alone can shape its course, or stop its progress. The Minister may disgust the people with their present Constitution; but he will do but mischief, unless he can go farther, and make them bow in grateful submission to his fantastic idol. On this head, therefore, do I declare myself in open hostility to your projected Union

I object, Sir, to the Union, because it goes to make Ireland a province. When Antoninus Caracalla gave to the inhabitants of the provinces, the stile, title, and privileges of Roman citizens, what was his object, and what were his means? His object was revenue; his means were tyranny and oppression. Sir, there is no instance in history of a nation separated from the governing country by the sea, that ever was prosperous or free. What was the fate

of one of the most lovely islands in the world, when appertaining to the freest state upon earth? Sicily, with all its advantages of nature, was sacrificed to the jealous freedom of Athens. There is something in the character of Britons, even on the score of freedom, that little disposes me to depend on them for mine. With some truth it has been remarked by a very great man (Mr. Sheridan), that the English are so fond of liberty themselves, they cannot spare an atom of it to any other people on earth. I am not enamoured of the situation in which I find the provinces of Britain; coast along the shores of Coromandel and Malabar; traverse the country from its southern to its northern extremity, and you will scarcely find a single acre, or a single individual holding out the aspect of protected humanity. Coast along those lovely islands planted in the bosom of the western ocean, and what do you see there? Cultivation produced by the traffic of nature, and human condition a system of slavery and oppression. Travel along the banks of the Ganges, and tell me whether, when you contemplate the stifled beauties and energies of nature, you will become the advocate for proud imperial legislation? I love not this word empire; it has deluged the world with blood, and never was achieved but by the downfall of the liberties of mankind. As for me, I own I have a delight in contemplating the many and various advantages of my country; I have persuaded myself that Providence has been most bounteous to us. I have not less delight in contemplating, that we have no empire to gain, no nations to conquer, no pursuits of ambition to run. No; we have no claim to the crimes and the execrations of aspiring humanity; we have no title to the armorial bear-

ings and bloody monuments of aggressive victory ; we are an humble, but a contented people. We think we have a right to be free ; we feel we have received that gift from the hands of God, and we trust that it is by the hands of God alone resumable.

THE END.



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2. Female Devotee of the Jentoo cast.
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4. Village Church, and Indians worshipping Polyar.
5. Church Brahmin, follower of Seeva.
6. Sepoy of Tippoo Sultaun's regular infantry.
7. Female Brahmins carrying water from the well.

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